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1 Introduction
The notions effectiveness, decisiveness and success are basic to the analysis of
voting systems. Yet, they do not only depend on the voting rule but also on the
underlying voting measure, i. e. on the correlation of the voting behavior between
the voters of the system. In the Penrose-Banzhaf case the voting measure gives
equal probability to all coalitions, thus reflecting the situation when each voter’s
decision is completely independent of the other voters. The corresponding power
index (in terms of decisiveness) is the well known Penrose-Banzhaf index. Under
this voting measure there is a simple formula connecting the power index of a
voter with the probability of success of this voter (see (26) below).
As was emphasized in [14], this intimate connection between decisiveness and
success is a peculiarity of the Penrose-Banzhaf measure. In particular there is no
analog for the Shapley-Shubik power index. The Shapley-Shubik index is based
on decisiveness under a voting measure we call the Shapley-Shubik measure. Un-
der this measure all coalitions of a given size k have the same (k-dependent) prob-
ability and the set of all coalitions of size k is given a probability independent of
k.
Among others we consider voting systems with ‘simple voting rule’, that is with
voting weight 1 for all voters, but with arbitrary relative quota r. For such sys-
tems we compute the probability of decisiveness and the rate of success under the
Penrose-Banzhaf measure and the Shapley-Shubik measure. One of the results
which we found surprising is that the rate of success under the Shapley-Shubik
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measure is (approximately) 3
4
in the case of simple majority (i. e. r = 1
2
). Thus it
is remarkably bigger than the rate of success under the Penrose-Banzhaf measure.
On the other hand the rate of decisiveness in the same situation is bigger under the
Penrose-Banzhaf measure.
We extend the mentioned result to general r, to weighted voting systems and to
more general voting measures.
2 Some Basics
IN this section we introduce some of the concepts basic for the rest of this paper.
For a thorough introduction we recommend [6], for an overview [19] or [9].
Definition 2.1. A voting system (V,V) consists of a (finite) set V of voters and a
subset V of P(V ), the system of all subsets of V , with the following properties
1. V ∈ V
2. ∅ /∈ V
3. If A ∈ V and A ⊂ B then B ∈ V .
Subsets of V are called coalitions. The coalitions in V are called winning, those
not in V losing.
Definition 2.2. A voting system (V,V) is called weighted if there is a function
w : V → [0,∞) and a q ∈ (0,∞) such that A ∈ V if and only if∑
v∈A
w(v) ≥ q (1)
The number w(v) is called the weight of the voter v, q is called the quota. The
number
r =
q∑
v∈V w(v)
(2)
is called the relative quota.
We call a weighted voting system simple, if w(v) = 1 for all v.
A simple voting system (V,V) is called a simple majority system if the relative
quota r is given by r = 1
2
+ 1
2N
, where N = |V | is the number of voters. In other
words, those coalitions are winning which contain more than half of the voters.
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There are various methods to quantify the notion ‘voting power’ in voting systems.
One of the best known concepts goes back to Penrose [15] and Banzhaf [2]. It is
based on the notion of ‘decisiveness’ and the treatment of all coalitions as ‘equally
likely’.
Definition 2.3. Suppose (V,V) is a voting system.
1. We call a voter v ∈ V winning decisive for a coalitionA ⊂ V if v /∈ A,A /∈
V and A ∪ {v} ∈ V .
We set
D+(v) := {A ⊂ V | v /∈ A,A /∈ V, A ∪ {v} ∈ V} (3)
2. We call a voter v ∈ V losing decisive for a coalition A ⊂ V if v ∈ A,A ∈
V, A \ {v} /∈ V .
We set
D−(v) := {A ⊂ V | v ∈ A,A ∈ V, A \ {v} /∈ V} (4)
3. We call v decisive forA if v is winning decisive or losing decisive forA and
set
D(v) := D+(v) ∪ D−(v) (5)
Definition 2.4. The Penrose-Banzhaf power PB(v) of a voter v is defined as
DB(v) =
|D(v)|
2N
(6)
where |A| denotes the number of elements of the set A and N = |V |.
This PB(v) is the proportion of all coalition for which v is decisive.
Remark 2.5. It is well known and easy to see that |D+(v)| = |D−(v)|, so
DB(v) =
|D+(v)|
2N−1
=
|D−(v)|
2N−1
(7)
The Penrose-Banzhaf power admits a prohabilistic interpretation. If we regard
all coalitions in P(V ) as equally likely (‘Laplace probability’) and denote the
corresponding measure on P(V ) by
PB(A) := |A||P(V )| =
|A|
2N
(8)
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then
DB(v) = PB
(
D(v)
)
. (9)
We call PB the Penrose-Banzhafmeasure.
Without loss we may assume that V = {1, · · · , N}.
Instead of consideringPB as a measure onP(V )wemay considerPB as a measure
on {0, 1}N(= {0, 1}V ) by
PB
(
{(x1, · · · , xN)}
)
:= PB
(
{{i|xi = 1}}
)
(10)
In the following we will switch freely between these versions of PB. Moreover, to
simplify notationwe will writePB
(
(x1, · · · , xN)
)
instead of PB
({(x1, · · · , xN)})
and PB(A) instead of PB({A}) for any A ∈ P(V ).
In this paper we will introduce and discuss various other measures on P(V )
resp. {0, 1}N which lead to different notions of voting power, for example to
the Shapley-Shubik index [17].
We now introduce this concept in an abstract setting.
Definition 2.6. A probability measure P on P(V ) (resp. {0, 1}N ) is called a
voting measure if
P(A) = P(V \ A) for all A ⊂ V (11)
resp. P
(
x1, · · · , xN)
)
= P
(
(1− x1, · · · , 1− xN )
)
.
The papers [8, 9] contain a discussion about why this is an appropriate definition.
As in the case of the Penrose-Banzhaf power we may define a voting power in
terms of decisiveness by
D+
P
(v) := P(D+(v)) (12)
D−
P
(v) := P(D−(v)) (13)
and DP(v) := P(D(v)) = D+P (v) +D−P (v) (14)
Note, that we destinguish here between D+
P
(v) (the probability to make a losing
coalition winning) and D−
P
(v) (the probability to make a winning coalition los-
ing). In contrast to the case of the Penrose-Banzhaf measure we can not conclude
P
(D+(v)) = P(D−(v)).
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Examples 2.7. We give some examples for voting measures:
1. The Penrose-Banzhaf measure.
2. The Shapley-Shubik measure.
If A ⊂ P(V ) with |V | = N and |A| = k then
PS(A) =
1
N + 1
1(
N
k
) (15)
(see [18]). This measure makes coalitions of the same cardinality equally
likely and satisfies
PS({A | |A| = k}) = 1
N + 1
(16)
By DS, D
+
S , D
−
S we denote the quantitiesDPS , D
+
PS
, D−
PS
.
PS can be written as
PS
(
(x1, · · · , xN )
)
=
∫ 1
0
p
∑
xi (1− p)N−
∑
xi dp (17)
3. The unanimity measure
Pu(A) =
{
1
2
if A = ∅ or A = V
0 otherwise
(18)
4. The common belief measure generalizes all three previous examples. Sup-
pose µ is a probability measure on [0, 1] (and the Borel σ-algebra) such that
µ([
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ b]) = µ([
1
2
− b, 1
2
− a]) (19)
then the measure
Pµ
(
(x1, · · · , xN )
)
=
∫ 1
0
p
∑
xi (1− p)N−
∑
xi dµ(p) (20)
is a voting measure. We call it the common belief voting measure with
CB-measure µ (see [8, 9] for a discussion of the Common Belief Model).
Since we have more to say about the common belief measure we introduce
another way to write it which will be convenient in later sections.
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We denote by P 1p the probability measure on {0, 1} defined by P 1p (1) = p
and P 1p (0) = 1 − p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and by PNp the n-fold product of P 1p on
{0, 1}N . Thus
PNp
(
(x1, x2, . . . , xN )
)
= p
∑
xi
(
1− p)N−∑xi (21)
Whenever N is clear from the context we write Pp instead of P
N
p .
With this notation (20) reads
Pµ
(
A
)
=
∫ 1
0
PNp
(
A
)
dµ(p) =
∫ 1
0
Pp
(
A
)
dµ(p) (22)
for all A ⊂ {0, 1}N .
The Penrose-Banzhaf measure correspond to the choice µ = δ 1
2
, the una-
nimity measure to µ = 1
2
δ0 +
1
2
δ1 and the Shapley-Shubik measure to the
uniform distribution (= Lebesgue measure) on [0, 1].
Instead of looking at the decisiveness of a voter one might define the influence
of a voter by considering the probability that the outcome of the voting coincides
with the voter’s opinion.
Definition 2.8. Suppose (V,V) is a voting system and P a voting measure on V .
We call the probability
S+
P
(v) = P({A ∈ V | v ∈ A}) (23)
the rate of affirmative success of the voter v (w.r.t. P).
Similarly,
S−
P
(v) = P({A /∈ V | v /∈ A}) (24)
is called the rate of blocking success.
The quantity
SP(v) = S
+
P
(v) + S−
P
(v) (25)
is called the (total) rate of success of v.
For the Penrose-Banzhaf measure the rate of success does not give new informa-
tion because
SPB(v) =
1
2
+
1
2
DB(v) (26)
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This equation goes back to [4].
Equation (26) is not true for other voting measures, in fact it is only true for the
Penrose-Banzhaf measure [14].
We introduce a final quantity for this section, namely the ‘efficiency’ of a voting
system, also called the ‘power of a collectivity to act’. It goes back to Coleman
[3] who introduced it in connection with the Penrose-Banzhaf measure.
Definition 2.9. If (V,V) is a voting system and P a voting measure on V then
EP := P(V) (27)
is called the efficiency of the voting system.
3 Permutation Invariant Voting Systems
In this section we classify voting systems and voting measures which are invariant
under permutations of the voters.
Definition 3.1. If pi is a permutation (=bijective mapping) on V and A ⊂ V , then
pi−1A := {v ∈ V | pi(v) ∈ A}.
We call a voting system (V,V) permutation invariant (or invariant for short) if for
any permutation pi, A ∈ V implies pi−1(A) ∈ V .
Invariant voting systems are easy to characterize: They obey the rule ”One person,
one vote!”.
Proposition 3.2. Every permutation invariant voting system (V,V) is a weighted
voting system. The weights can be chosen to be equal to 1 for all voters in V .
Proof: If coalitions A and B in V contain the same number of voters, then
there is a permutation on V that maps A bijective onto B. It follows that A ∈ V
if and only if B ∈ V . In other words, whether A is winning depends only on the
cardinality |A| of A.
Denote by q the smallest number such that |A| = q implies A ∈ V . Then, by
monotonicity of V , |B| ≥ q implies B ∈ V . Since q is the smallest such number
|B| < q implies B 6∈ V .
Thus (V,V) is a weighted voting system with weights w(v) ≡ 1 and quota q.
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Definition 3.3. Suppose V is a finite set. A measure P on V is called permuta-
tion invariant or exchangeable if P(A) = P(pi−1A) for each A ⊂ V and each
permutation pi on V .
All voting measures introduced in Example 2.7 are exchangeable.
Since we are interested in the behavior of quantities like power indices and success
rates for large voting system, we concentrate on voting measures which can be
extended to arbitrary large sets in a natural way, i. e. such that the extension is still
exchangeable.
If the set V of voters has N elements we may set V = {1, 2, . . . , N} without loss
of generality and consider a voting measure as a measure on {0, 1}N as in (10).
Definition 3.4. We call an exchangeable measure P on {0, 1}N extendable if for
every N ′ > N there is an exchangeable measure P′ on {0, 1}N ′ such that P is the
restriction of P′ on {0, 1}N .
The voting measures of Example 2.7 are extendable.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose P is an exchangeable and extendable voting measure on
V = {1, 2, . . . , N} then P is a common belief measure (see Example 2.7.4),
i. e. there is a measure µ on [0, 1] with (19) such that
Pµ
(
A
)
=
∫ 1
0
Pp
(
A
)
dµ(p) (28)
Theorem 3.5 is a version of the celebrated theorem of de Finetti ([5]). De Finetti’s
theorem can be found at various places and in various formulations, see e. g. [1]
or [11]. For an introduction and an elementary proof see [7].
Proof: Kolmogorov’s extension theorem ensures that there is an exchangeable
measure P˜ on {0, 1}N whose restriction on {0, 1}N is given by P.
By de Finetti’s theorem P˜ and therefore P have the structure (28). The property
(19) follows from the assumption that P is a voting measure.
4 Penrose-Banzhaf vs. Shapley-Shubik: A case study
In this section we consider the behavior of efficiency, decisiveness and rate of
success in simple voting systems under the Penrose-Banzhaf and the Shapley-
Shubik measure. Our first result is
8
Proposition 4.1. Let (V,V) be a simple majority voting system withN voters then
1. DB(v) ≈
2√
2pi
· 1√
N
as N →∞ and (29)
EB ≈ 1
2
as N →∞ (30)
2. DS(v) =
1
N
for all N and (31)
ES ≈ 1
2
as N →∞ (32)
Notation 4.2. By aN ≈ bN we mean aNbN → 1 as N →∞.
Proof: The proof of 1. is quite standard, see for example [6].
2. follows from the fact that
∑
v∈V DS(v) = 1 and DS(v) = DS(v
′
) for all v, v
′
.
Remark 4.3. A calculation shows that for odd N
D−S (v) = D
+
S (v) =
1
2
1
N
(33)
and for even N
D−S (v) =
1
2
1
N
− 1
2N(N + 1)
(34)
D+S (v) =
1
2
1
N
+
1
2N(N + 1)
(35)
Proposition 4.1 has an immediate consequences for the success rate of voters.
From (26) we infer that
SB(v) ≈ 1
2
+
1√
2pi
1√
N
(36)
for simple majority voting systems.
As one might expect the Penrose-Banzhaf power goes to zero as N increases and
the success rate goes to 1
2
, the success rate of a dummy player.
The Shapley-Shubik power goes to zero as N → ∞ as well, in fact, even faster
than the Penrose-Banzhaf power (see Proposition 4.1).
It may be somewhat surprising that the Shapley-Shubik success rate does not go
to 1
2
, but rather stays at about 3
4
independent of the size of V . We will prove this
fact in greater generality below.
Now, we turn to simple voting systems with a qualified majority, i.e. we consider
weighted voting systems with weights w(v) = 1 and arbitrary relative quota r.
First, we look at the behavior of the efficiency for fixed r and N large.
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Theorem 4.4. Suppose (V,V) is a weighted system with N voters, with weights
w(v) = 1 for all v ∈ V and relative quota r. Then
1. EB →

1 for r < 1
2
1
2
for r = 1
2
0 for r > 1
2
2. For r > 1
2
EB ≤ e−2(r− 12 )2N (37)
This theorem tells us that the (Banzhaf-)efficiency of a voting game goes ex-
tremely fast to zero if the voting body is enlarged and the relative quota is kept
fixed at r > 1
2
. This is exactly what happened for the Council of the European
Union during EU enlargements!
Proof: Part 1. follows from the strong law of large numbers [11] and Proposi-
tion 4.1.
2. is an application of Hoeffding’s inequality (see the Appendix).
In contrast to the above result, the efficiency according to Shapley-Shubik does
not go to zero for r > 1/2.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose (V,V) is a weighted voting system withN voters, weights
w(v) = 1 for all v ∈ V and relative quota r.
ES → (1− r) as N →∞. (38)
Proof: From (22) we infer
ES = PS(
∑
Xi ≥ rN) (39)
=
∫ 1
0
Pp(
1
N
∑
Xi ≥ r) dp (40)
The expression under the integral in (40)
Pp(
1
N
∑
Xi ≥ r) (41)
is the probability with respect to Pp that the arithmetic mean of the Xi is not less
than r. The random variables Xi are independent under the measure Pp. Thus
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we may apply the law of large numbers to show that this expression goes to 0 for
r > p and to 1 for r < p. Consequently (40) converges to
∫ 1
r
dp = 1− r (42)
We turn to an investigation of the success rate.
Before we consider the case of arbitrary r we discuss in detail the case r = 1
2
.
It is quite obvious that for simple majority systems
S+B (v)→
1
4
and S−B (v)→
1
4
as N →∞ (43)
The following result about S+S and S
−
S is perhaps not so obvious.
Theorem 4.6. Let (V,V) be a simple majority voting system with N voters, then
S+S (v) =
{
3
8
+ 1
8
1
N
for odd N
3
8
− 1
8
1
N+1
for even N
(44)
S−S (v) =
{
3
8
+ 1
8
1
N
for odd N
3
8
+ 3
8
1
N+1
for even N
(45)
Consequently
SS(v) =
{
3
4
+ 1
4
1
N
for odd N
3
4
+ 1
4
1
N+1
for even N
(46)
In particular
SS(v) ≈ 3
4
as N →∞ (47)
Proof: We may assume that V = {1, 2, . . . , N} and v = 1. Let us start withN
odd, say N = 2n+ 1.
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Then
S+S (1) = PS(x1 = 1,
N∑
i=2
xi ≥ n)
=
∫ 1
0
Pp(x1 = 1,
N∑
i=2
xi ≥ n) dp
=
∫ 1
0
p · Pp(
N∑
i=2
xi ≥ n) dp
=
N−1∑
k=n
(
N − 1
k
)∫ 1
0
pk+1(1− p)N−(k+1) dp
=
1
N + 1
N−1∑
k=n
(
N−1
k
)(
N
k+1
) = 1
N + 1
N−1∑
k=n
k + 1
N
=
1
N(N + 1)
N∑
k=n+1
k =
1
N(N + 1)
1
2
(
N(N + 1)− n(n+ 1))
=
1
2
− 1
2
n(n+ 1)
N(N + 1)
=
1
2
− 1
8
(N − 1)(N + 1)
N(N + 1)
=
3
8
+
1
8
1
N
(48)
S−S (1) = PS(x1 = 0,
N∑
i=2
xi ≤ n)
=
n∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)∫ 1
0
(1− p)pk(1− p)N−k−1 dp
=
n∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)∫ 1
0
pk(1− p)N−k dp
=
1
N + 1
n∑
k=0
(
N−1
k
)(
N
k
)
=
1
N(N + 1)
n∑
k=0
(N − k) = 1
N(N + 1)
(
(n+ 1)N − 1
2
n(n + 1)
)
=
3
8
+
1
8
1
N
(49)
12
Thus for N odd we have
S+S (1) = S
−
S (1) =
3
8
+
1
8
1
N
(50)
and SS(1) =
3
4
+
1
4
1
N
→ 3
4
(51)
The calculation for even N goes along the same lines.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose (V,V) is a weighted voting system withN voters, weights
w(v) = 1 for all v ∈ V and relative quota r.
1.
SB(v)→ 1
2
as N →∞ (52)
For r > 1
2
S+B (v) ≤
1
2
e−2(r−
1
2
)2(N−1) (53)
2.
S+S (v)→
1
2
− 1
2
r2 as N →∞ (54)
S−S (v)→
1
2
− 1
2
(1− r)2 as N →∞ (55)
Consequently
SS(v)→ 1− 1
2
(r2 + (1− r)2) as N →∞ (56)
Remark 4.8. SS(v) ≈ 1 − 12(r2 + (1 − r)2) is biggest for r = 12 where it equals
3
4
and smallest for r = 0 and r = 1 where it is 1
2
.
Proof:
1.
S+B (1) = PB(x1 = 1,
N∑
i=2
xi ≥ rN − 1) (57)
=
1
2
PB(
N∑
i=2
xi ≥ rN − 1) (58)
13
since under PB the xi are independent.
Another application of Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem A.1) gives (53).
Similarly
S−B (1) =
1
2
PB(
N∑
i=2
xi < rN)
so
SB(1) =
1
2
(1 + PB(
N∑
i=2
xi ∈ [rN − 1, rN)))
≤ 1
2
+ C
1√
N
(59)
2. A computation as in the proof of Theorem 4.6 shows that
PS(x1 = 1,
N∑
i=2
xi ≥M)
=
1
2
− 1
2
M(M + 1)
N(N + 1)
(60)
If we insertM = ⌈rN⌉ − 1, where ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer not less than x, we
obtain
S+S (1) =
1
2
− 1
2
(⌈rN⌉ − 1)⌈rN⌉
N(N + 1)
→ 1
2
− 1
2
r2 as N →∞ (61)
Similarly
S−S (1) = PS(x1 = 0,
N∑
i=2
xi ≤ ⌈rN⌉ − 1)
= PS(x1 = 1,
N∑
i=2
xi ≥ N − ⌈rN⌉)
=
1
2
− 1
2
(N − ⌈rN⌉)(N − ⌈rN⌉ + 1)
N(N + 1)
→ 1
2
− 1
2
(1− r)2 (62)
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5 Weighted Voting Systems and the Common Belief
Model
We turn to our most general case.
In this section we consider large weighted voting system. More precisely, we
consider a sequence {wn}n∈N of non negative real numbers and for each N the
voting system with weights w1, · · · , wN and (fixed) relative quota r, thus we have
voting systems (VN ,VN ) with VN = {1, · · · , N} and A ∈ VN if and only if∑
i∈A
wi ≥ r
∑
i∈VN
wi (63)
To shorten notation we write w(A) =
∑
i∈A wi and w(N) =
∑N
i=1wi.
On (VN ,VN) we consider the voting measure
Pµ(A) =
∫ 1
0
p|A|(1− p)N−|A| dµ(p) (64)
for A ⊂ VN and a measure µ on [0, 1] with µ([12 + a, 12 + b]) = µ([12 − a, 12 − b]).
Definition 5.1. We define the Laakso-Taagepera index of the sequence {wn} by
LTN =
∑N
n=1w
2
n
(
∑N
n=1wn)
2
(65)
The Laakso-Taagepera index is named after [12].
We start with a result of Langner [13].
Theorem 5.2. If LTN → 0 and µ({r}) = 0 then the efficiency EN of the voting
systems (VN ,VN ) satisfies
EN → µ([r, 1]) (66)
For the reader’s convenience we reprove this theorem.
Proof:
EN =
∫ 1
0
Pp
( N∑
i=1
wiXi ≥ r
N∑
i=1
wi
)
dµ(p) (67)
By Corollary A.3 the integrand converges to 0 for r > p and to 1 for r < p, hence
EN →
∫ 1
0
χ{p>r}(p) dµ(p) = µ([r, 1]) . (68)
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where
χp>r(p) =
{
1, if p > r;
0, otherwise.
We estimate
Pp(|
∑
wixi − p
∑
wi| ≥ α
∑
wi)
≤ 1
α2
∑
iEp((
∑
wi(xi − p))2)
(
∑
wi)2
=
1
α2
p(1− p)
∑
iw
2
i
(
∑
wi)2
=
p(1− p)
α2
LTN (69)
It follows that
EN =
∫ 1
0
Pp(
∑
wixi ≥ r
∑
wi) dµ(p) (70)
converges to ∫ 1
0
χ(p > r) dµ(p) = µ([r, 1]) (71)
In a similar way we can compute the rate of success in such systems.
Theorem 5.3. If LTN → 0 and µ({r}) = 0 then the rate of success with respect
to Pµ satisfies
S+
Pµ
(v)→
∫ 1
r
p dµ(p) (72)
S−
Pµ
(v)→
∫ 1
r−1
p dµ(p) (73)
Proof: Without loss we compute the rate of success for voter i = 1.
S+
Pµ
(1) =
∫ 1
0
Pp(x1 = 1,
N∑
i=2
wixi ≥ r
∑
wi − w1) dµ(p)
=
∫ 1
0
pPp(
N∑
i=2
wixi ≥ r
∑
wi − w1) dµ(p)
→
∫ 1
r
p dµ(p) (74)
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A Appendix
For the reader’s convenience, in this appendix we present a few results needed in
the main text. In particular, we formulate Hoeffding’s inequality.
Theorem A.1 (Hoeffding’s Inequality). Suppose Xi, i = 1, . . . , N are indepen-
dent random variables such thatXi ∈ [ai, bi] almost surely.
Set σ2 =
∑N
i=1(bi − ai)2. Then
P
( N∑
i=1
Xi ≥ E(Xi) + λ
)
≤ e−2 λσ2 and (75)
P
( N∑
i=1
Xi ≤ E(Xi)− λ
)
≤ e−2 λσ2 (76)
For a proof of Theorem A.1 see e. g. [16].
An immediate consequence of Hoeffding’s inequality is the following proposition.
As before Pp with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 denotes the probability measure on {0, 1}N given
by:
Pp
(
x1, x2, . . . , xN
)
= p
∑
xi
(
1− p)N−∑xi (77)
and Ep denotes expectation with respect to Pp.
Proposition A.2. Let Xi, i = 1, . . . , N be random variables with distribution Pp
and w1, . . . , wN ∈ [0,∞), then for λ ≥ 0
Pp
(∣∣ N∑
i=1
wiXi − p
N∑
i=1
wi
∣∣ ≥ α N∑
i=1
wi
)
≤ 2 e−2α
2 (
∑
wi)
2
∑
w2
i (78)
Proof: The random variables Yi = wiXi are independent (under Pp) and take
values in [0, wi]]. Moreover Ep(Yi) = pwi. Thus (78) follows from Theorem A.1.
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Corollary A.3. Suppose the Laakso-Taagepera index LTN =
∑
w2i
(
∑
wi)2
goes to zero
as N →∞ then
If α > p Pp
( N∑
i=1
wiXi ≥ α
N∑
i=1
wi
)
→ 0 as N →∞ (79)
If α < p Pp
( N∑
i=1
wiXi ≤ α
N∑
i=1
wi
)
→ 0 as N →∞ (80)
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